| Posted: 24 June 2022 at 3:02pm | IP Logged | 2
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As David rightly noted above, Justice Thomas makes explicit what is implicit in the majority opinion:
>> The Court today declines to disturb substantive due process jurisprudence generally or the doctrine’s application inother, specific contexts. Cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965) (right of married persons to obtain contraceptives)*; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (rightto engage in private, consensual sexual acts); and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to same-sex marriage), are not at issue. The Court’s abortion cases areunique, see ante, at 31–32, 66, 71–72, and no party hasasked us to decide “whether our entire Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence must be preserved or revised,” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 813 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).
Thus, I agreethat “[n]othing in [the Court’s] opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.” Ante, at 66.
For that reason, in future cases, we should reconsider allof this Court’s substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell.
Because any substantive due process decision is “demonstrably erroneous,”Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (THOMAS, J.,concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 7), we have a duty to“correct the error” established in those precedents, Gamblev. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 9). After overruling these demonstrably erroneous decisions, the question would remainwhether other constitutional provisions guarantee the myriad rights that our substantive due process cases have generated. <<
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